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A jury from which some persons, whose answers make it doubtful
as to whether they would ever vote for the extreme penalty, were
challenged for cause and others in the same category were included
in the jury might result in a ruling of "harmless error."2
If Witherspoon is literally interpreted27 it would be advisable that the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure2' be revised to incorporate its requirements. This would result in giving the state power to challenge a juror
for cause on the basis of his attitude toward the death penalty only when
it is clear from the prospective juror's answers that he would automatically vote against capital punishment without regard to the evidence that
might emerge at trial.
In Pittman prospective jurors apparently were challenged for cause
simply on the basis of opposition and conscientious scruples to the death
penalty. Thus, if the Pittinan jury were impaneled by challenging for
cause not only those who stated that they could never vote for the extreme penalty, but also all of those who expressed conscientious scruples
and were doubtful as to whether or not they could ever vote for capital
punishment, " the decision would be reversed if considered by the United
States Supreme Court.
Glen A. Majure
(4)

Procedure - Tolling Statute Held Operative When Absent
Defendant Is Subject to Texas Jurisdiction Under
the Non-Resident Motorist Statute
Plaintiffs sustained injuries in an automobile accident with defendants
while all parties were residents of Texas. A few months later defendants
moved to Florida. Over two years after the accident plaintiffs filed suit in
a Texas court to recover damages resulting from the accident. Jurisdic2" The validity of this statement depends on whether or not the Supreme Court applies Witherspoon in future cases as suggested in note 15 supra. The fact that the decision in Witherspoon is
based on constitutional rights would not prevent such a result. The United States Supreme Court
has already held that there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular
case are so unimportant that they may, consistent with the United States Constitution, be deemed
harmless, not resulting in the automatic reversal of a case. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 21-22 (1967).
"'An element of caution should be injected into an interpretation of the Witherspoon decision.
If the decision is interpreted literally by the Supreme Court in its future application the results will
be far reaching. See text accompanying notes 27-28 infra. However, it should be noted that this
decision was handed down in a case where the facts revealed an extreme situation in which the state
had stacked the cards against the defendant by impaneling a hanging jury. See 391 U.S. at 523.
The decision in Witherspoon is broad enough that the Court could easily turn away from a literal
application. See note 15 sipra for a discussion of a practical future application of the decision.
2
TEx. CODE CslM. PRoc. ANN. art. 35.16(b)l (1965).
2 Reliance is placed here upon the assertion by attorneys for Pittman who state that "The twelve
jurors who were finally selected in the Pittman case in no way expressed any doubt as to their
ability to vote for capital punishment." If this is true the final jury was composed of twelve persons
who expressed no conscientious scruples to the death penalty while at least ten persons were challenged for cause either on the basis of simple conscientious scruples or answers which left doubt as
to their view concerning capital punishment. See note 19 supra.
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tion over defendants and service of process were obtained pursuant to the
Texas non-resident motorist statute.' Defendants moved to dismiss on the
ground that suit was barred by the two-year statute of limitations.' The
motion was granted by the trial court, but the court of civil appeals reversed, holding that the statute of limitations was suspended during defendants' absence from the state by operation of the Texas tolling statute.'
Held, affirmed: Limitations are tolled during defendant's absence from
the state despite the fact that defendant could have been constructively
served with process and sued under the non-resident motorist statute.
Vaughn v. Deitz, 430 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. 1968).

I.

INTERPRETATION

OF TOLLING STATUTES

In General. A binding state court judgment cannot be rendered against
a person who is not present within the state and is not otherwise subject
to the state's jurisdiction." Thus it was at one time somewhat common
for non-resident debtors to remain outside of a state until the statute of
limitations on their debts had run. The debtors could then re-enter the
state and do business with impunity.' To mitigate against this abuse of
the statute of limitations most states enacted "tolling" statutes,' which
provide that limitations are tolled when a person against whom there is a
cause of action is absent from the state.
Unfortunately, most tolling statutes fail to specify whether they are
operative when the potential defendant is physically absent from the
state but is nevertheless amenable to some form of substituted service of
process and suit because he owns land within the state,' is a domiciliary of
the state,' has consented to the state's jurisdiction,' or has certain "minimum contacts" with the state.'" The lack of statutory authority has pro'TEX.
REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2039a (1958) provides a statutory scheme for substituted
service of process against a non-resident motorist by serving the Chairman of the State Highway
Commission and forwarding notice to the non-resident defendant.
2Id. art. 5526 (1958) provides in part that all actions for injuries to the property or person
of another "shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action shall
have accrued."
aid. art. 5537 (1958), which provides:
If any person against whom there shall be cause of action shall be without the limits
of this State at the time of the accruing of such action, or at any time during which
the same might have been maintained, the person entitled to such action shall be at
liberty to bring the same against such person after his return to the State and the
time of such person's absence shall not be accounted or taken as part of the time
limited by any provision of this title.
4
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
'Wilson v. Daggett, 88 Tex. 375, 31 S.W. 618 (1895); Harris v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 405 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), error ref. n.'r.e.
6These statutes originated in England and provided for the tolling of limitations while a
defendant was "beyond the seas." H. BUSWELL, THE STATUTE o, LIMITATIONS AND ADVERSE
POSSESSION § 16 (1889).
'Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890)
(upholding state statute authorizing service by
publication in in rem action). It is recognized that adequate notice is an additional requirement
regardless of the basis of judicial jurisdiction. This aspect is assumed throughout the discussion
of this Note.
" Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
'York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
t
"Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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duced a division among the courts which have been called on to interpret
the phrase "without the state" or its equivalent."
A minority of courts have interpreted the phrase literally. 2 Thus defendant's absence from the state was regarded by them as sufficient to
invoke the tolling statute, notwithstanding the fact that defendant was
subject to the state's jurisdiction and could have been sued during his absence. These courts have reasoned that to reach the opposite result would
constitute judicial legislation." Further, some have argued that substituted service of process may be inconvenient and expensive to plaintiff,
who may be required to locate defendant and ensure that he receives constitutionally adequate notice of the action.'
By contrast, the majority of courts have resolved the question of defendant's "absence" in terms of the state's jurisdiction over him." Accordingly, they have held tolling statutes inoperable, despite defendant's
absence from the state, in action in rem" and under a long-arm or nonresident motorist statute.' These courts have reasoned that since the potential defendant is subject to service of process and suit despite his absence, the purpose of the tolling statute would not be served by suspending limitations. Further, according to the majority, tolling the statute of
limitations when the absent defendant is subject to suit would militate
against the purpose of limitations by permitting the plaintiff to sue at his
pleasure.
In Texas. Texas courts have been somewhat inconsistent in their application of the Texas tolling statute" to cases in which the potential defendant was absent but nevertheless was subject to Texas' jurisdiction. In
two early cases ' involving the effect of absence from the jurisdiction of
an adverse claimant to Texas realty, the supreme court held that limitations were tolled during the claimant's absence although he could have
" Most tolling statutes typically refer to the defendant being "without the state" and do not
indicate if this means physical absence or for purposes of jurisdiction. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-590 (1958).
v. Weiss, 78 Idaho 616, 308 P.2d 1021 (1957); Gotheiner v. Lenihan, 20 N.J.
'"Staten
Misc. 119, 25 A.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Maguire v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 253 App. Div. 249,
1 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1938); Couts v. Rose, 152 Ohio St. 458, 90 N.E.2d 139 (1950); Bode v.
Flynn, 213 Wis. 509, 252 N.W. 284 (1934).
"aE.g., Parker v. Kelly, 61 Wis. 552, 21 N.W. 539, 541 (1884).
Staten v. Weiss, 78 Idaho 616, 308 P.2d 1021, 1023 (1957); Haver v. Bassett, 287
'"E.g.,
S.W.2d 342, 345-46 (Mo. 1956); Maguire v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 253 App. Div. 249, 1
N.Y.S.2d 749, 752 (1938).
"5Peters v. Tuell Dairy Co., 250 Ala. App. 600, 35 So. 2d 344 (1948); Coombs v. Darling,
116 Conn. 643, 166 A. 70 (1933); Nelson v. Richardson, 295 I11. App. 504, 15 N.E.2d 17
(1938); Kokenge v. Holthaus, 243 Iowa 571, 52 N.W.2d 711 (1952); Fuller v. Stuart, 3
Misc. 2d 456, 153 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Canaday v. Hayden, 80 Ohio App. 1, 74
N.E.2d 635 (1947); Busby v. Shafer, 75 S.D. 428, 66 N.W.2d 910 (1954); Arroweed v.
McMinn County, 173 Tenn. App. 562, 121 S.W.2d 566 (1938); Reed v. Rosenfield, 51 A.2d
189 (Vt. 1947).
"8Ridgeway v. Salrin, 41 Cal. App. 2d 50, 105 P.2d 1024 (1940); TEx. R. Civ. P. 811
provides that in in rem actions service may be made on non-residents by publication as provided
by TEx. R. Civy. P. 114-116.
17Staten v. Weiss, 78 Idaho 616, 308 P.2d 1021 (1957).
18See note 3 supra.
"gWilson v. Daggett, 88 Tex. 375, 31 S.W. 618 (1895); Huff v. Crawford, 88 Tex. 368,
30 S.W. 546 (1895).
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been served by publication and sued at any time during the period he
was out of the state. In both cases the court voiced dissatisfaction with
the application of the tolling statute to in rem actions but "felt constrained to hold"20 it applicable in the absence of legislative modification.
Conversely, the courts of civil appeals have held the tolling statute inapplicable in cases" in which an out-of-state corporation was subject to
constructive service of process and suit under the Texas long-arm statute,
article 203 lb. 2 These courts have reasoned, like the majority of non-Texas
courts, that since the only purpose of the tolling statute is to protect
plaintiff's cause of action while defendant is beyond the reach of the
courts, "whenever the person or corporation can be reached by personal
service the reason for the rule ceases ...."2
Application of the tolling statute to an absent individual subject to in
personam jurisdiction was not considered by the Texas courts prior to
Vaughn v. Deitz. However, the Fifth Circuit considered this question in
the 1947 case of Gibson v. Nadel." The court predicted that Texas would
hold that the tolling statute "should be applied as written without addition to or subtraction from it."' Thus defendant's absence from the
state was held to prevent the running of limitations even though he could
have been served with process constructively and sued during his absence.
II.

VAUGHN V. DEITZ

The basic conflict in Vaughn was between the spirit and the letter of
the law. The supreme court opted for the latter, concluding that the
phrase "without the limits" refers to the physical presence of the defendant and not to his presence for jurisdictional purposes. The court noted
that the precise point at issue had not been decided by Texas courts;
however, the court saw no material distinction, for purposes of the tolling statute, between an in rem action and an in personam action against
an individual under the non-resident motorist statute, since in either case
the defendant may be served and sued despite his absence from the state.
The prior civil appeals cases holding that limitations were not tolled
against an out-of-state corporation which could have been sued pursuant
to article 2031 b were not mentioned.
The court dismissed the constitutional argument that the distinction
between a resident and a non-resident with regard to the tolling statute
denies a non-resident equal protection of the law.* Equal protection of
the law is not denied if the same procedure is applied to all persons under
similar circumstances. The court held that absence from the state is not
an unreasonable or arbitrary basis of classification, and emphasized the
2

Wilson v. Daggett, 88 Tex. 375, 377, 31 S.W. 618, 619 (1895).
Broadcasting System, Inc., 405 S.W.2d 613

21Harris v. Columbia

(Tex. Civ. App. 1966),

error22 ref. n.r.e.; Thompson v. Texas Land & Cattle Co., 24 S.W. 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893).
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (1964).
'Thompson
v. Texas Land & Cattle Co., 24 S.W. 856, 857 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893).
24164 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1947).
s1d. at 971.
e U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
27
Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101 (1898).

2
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greater expense and difficulty in obtaining constructive service of process
as compared to that incurred in obtaining personal service. This argument
seems weak because the vehicle registration and tax records maintained
by all states, as well as the Texas statute requiring that persons involved
in an automobile accident give their names and addresses to the other vehicle operator, 8 afford sufficient opportunity to obtain the information
necessary to effect constructive service of process on the non-resident motorist. There is no greater difficulty incurred under this procedure than in
the case where defendant lives outside the immediate area of plaintiff's
residence but within the state.
In dissent, Justice Pope argued quite cogently that the phrase "without
the limits" was intended to refer to presence for purposes of jurisdiction
rather than physical presence. Thus limitations should not have been
tolled, because the non-resident motorist statute fixed the "constructive
presence" of defendants in Texas. Justice Pope felt that this interpretation
of the tolling statute was more in accord with the spirit of both the tolling statute and the statute of limitations. He also noted that Vaughn
was inconsistent with the previous civil appeals cases holding the tolling
statute inapplicable to a corporation "without the state" but subject to
constructive service of process and suit under article 2031b.
III. CONCLUSION

Vaughn is not surprising in light of the previous Texas supreme court
decisions holding that limitations are tolled in in rem actions when defendant is out of state. Nevertheless, these decisions did not have to be
followed, and it seems clear that the reason for the result in Vaughn is
the supreme court's reluctance to engage in judicial legislation. Although
such restraint is normally commendable, in this case it may have been inappropriate, for the responsibility for rectifying the inequitable result of
Vaughn now lies with the Texas Legislature. The possibility that this body,
which necessarily caters to Texans, will amend the tolling statute to benefit non-resident delinquent debtors is something less than a certainty.
Vaughn raises a question as to whether the previous civil appeals cases
holding the tolling statute inapplicable to out-of-state corporations subject to Texas' jurisdiction are still good law. It seems probable that these
cases are overruled and that limitations will now be tolled against such
corporations, for there is no reasonable distinction between a corporation
and an individual when in personam jurisdiction is available against each.
If the civil appeals cases are not overruled, an inconsistency has crept into
Texas law.
Dan M. Cain

28 Tx. Rvm Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d, S 40 (1960).

